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JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW
This appeal is from a final Decree of Divorce entered
on September 20, 1988•

This court has jurisdiction to decide

the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(h)
(1987).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

After an eleven-year traditional marriage in

which the physician-husband pursued a lucrative career while
the wife played a supportive role/ was it manifestly
inequitable to exclude from the marital estate the value of the
professional corporation, royalty rights, and a substantial
portion of the retirement benefits the husband accrued during
the marriage, when 67 percent of the remaining marital assets
were also awarded to the husband?
2.

Is the fact that the wife enjoyed a standard of

living beyond her own earning capacity during the marriage a
permissible ground for awarding approximately 80 percent of the
assets accumulated during the marriage to the husband under the
standards established by the Supreme Court of Utah and this
court?
THE GOVERNING STATUTE
Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-5(1) (Supp. 1988) provides,
in pertinent part:
When a decree of divorce is rendered, the
court may include in it equitable orders relating
to the children, property, and parties•
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The parties were married on December 17, 1977. They
were unable to have children and the husband, Dr. Harold K.
Dunn (hereinafter HDr. Dunn-), refused to adopt.

Appellant

Connie T. Dunn (hereinafter HMrs. DunnM) filed her Complaint in
the district court on December 3, 1986, several months after
Dr. Dunn repealed that he was involved with another woman and
moved from the parties* residence.

The Complaint named both

Harold K. Dunn and his professional corporation, Harold K.
Dunn, M.D., P.C. (hereinafter "the professional corporation"),
as defendants, and both are respondents to this appeal.
The case was tried on May 11 and 12, 1988, with
closing arguments presented on May 16, 1988. On May 26, 1988,
the district court entered its Memorandum Decision.

On June

10, 1988, Mrs. Dunn filed a Motion for Reconsideration and
Clarification of Memorandum Decision.

The district court

denied that motion by Order entered September 7, 1988. On
September 20, 1988, the district court entered its Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce.
was granted on the grounds of mental cruelty.

The divorce

Mrs. Dunn filed

her Notice of Appeal on October 19, 1988.
The district court awarded approximately 80 percent of
the assets which the parties accumulated during their
eleven-year marriage to Dr. Dunn.-

Essentially, the court

found that, although the parties had acquired substantial

R000218-000223.

See Appendix 1.
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assets, the bulk of those assets should be awarded to Dr. Dunn
because he had earned virtually all of the marital income.

It

held that the supportive role Mrs. Dunn had performed for
eleven years had been sufficiently compensated by the high
standard of living she had enjoyed as the doctor's wife, which
it found -was substantially greater than she ever could have
achieved on her own.M

R000209-000210.

Adopting Dr. Dunn's

proposed distribution of marital assets, which was not admitted
into evidence, it awarded Mrs. Dunn a minimal portion of the
marital estate and three years' alimony, and denied her
application for attorney fees.

R000114, 000116, 000117,

000218-000223, Trial Exhibit D-24, R000241 at 99. Mrs. Dunn
appeals the property division.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
A.

The Parties' Circumstances At The Time
Of The Marriage.

At the time of the marriage, Mrs. Dunn was 26 years
old.

She had been married briefly, but had no children.

R000242 at 144, 149.

She held an associate degree from the

Stevens Henager Business School and worked full-time as a
medical secretary.

R000242 at 113, 145.

Dr. Dunn was 39 years old, had been married previously
for 17 years, and had two children.

R000241 at 24. He was an

associate professor at the University of Utah School of
Medicine, and practiced orthopedic surgery at the University's
Division of Orthopedic Services and at Shriners Hospital.
R000242 at 14, Trial Exhibit D-22.
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B.

The Parties' Contributions To The
Marriage.

During the marriage, Dr. Dunn devoted virtually all of
his time to his extremely successful career, working 60 to 70
hours per week.

He was promoted to full Professor in 1980, and

became Chairman of the University's Department of Orthopedics
in 1981.

He continued to practice as an orthopedic surgeon,

and incorporated Harold K. Dunn, M.D., P.C. in 1981.
at 22, 34-36.

R000242

He served as a visiting professor at numerous

institutions and published many articles on the constantlychanging surgical techniques and devices in the field of
orthopedics«

R000241 at 39, Trial Exhibit D-22. At the same

time, he served in committee and officer positions in the
American Academy of Orthopedic Surgeons ("the Academy"), and
was invited to join the prestigious 12-member American Board of
Orthopedic Surgery.

He spent approximately two weekends a

month traveling in connection with the Academy, the Board and
other professional activities.
R000241 at 43.

R000242 at 13, 14-15, 121-122,

Although he had earned his credentials and

established an excellent professional reputation before the
marriage, his most significant professional accomplishments
followed his 1977 marriage to Mrs. Dunn, as reflected in his
Curriculum Vitae.

R000241 at 42-43, 46-47, Trial Exhibit D-22.

Dr. Dunn also worked on the development of new
orthopedic products during the marriage.

Together with another

doctor, he designed surgical instruments for the implantation
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of an artificial knee known as the Miller-Galante knee, which
was being marketed by Zimmer, Inc. ("Zimmer-).

On December 1,

1985/ he executed a License Agreement with Zimmer which
provided fixed royalty payments in exchange for a license to
use and sell those surgical instruments.

Trial Exhibit P-4.

In addition, he worked on the development of a hip device and
consulted for Zimmer on spinal devices.

R000242 at 44-45,

Trial Exhibits P-5 and P-6.
Dr. Dunn's income increased substantially during the
marriage, rising from $71,381 in 1977 to $357,889 in 1987.
R000242 at 187. Trial Exhibit P-l.

During that time,

Mrs. Dunn devoted herself almost exclusively to supporting her
husband's career.

She resigned from her secretarial position

about 18 months after the marriage, in order to free her time
to travel with him to professional activities, perform
secretarial and bookkeeping services for him, and manage their
domestic affairs.

R000242 at 113-114, 155.

When children did

not arrive after seven years of marriage, she wanted to adopt,
but Dr. Dunn, who already had two sons, refused to do so.
R000242 at 19, 118.
Mrs. Dunn traveled to meetings of the Academy and
other professional associations, participated in their
activities, and entertained Dr. Dunn's professional and
business associates.

R000242 at 12-17, 113-117, 184-185.

After the professional corporation was formed in 1981, she
performed secretarial and bookkeeping functions for it, as well
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as for Dr. Dunn's family limited partnership and the parties
personal investments, all without compensation.
10-12, 114-116, 118.

R000242 at

She oversaw the construction and

finishing of a large home which the parties built in 1984
primarily to facilitate Dr. Dunn's business entertainment.
R000242 at 19, 117. Throughout the marriage, she took full
responsibility for the maintenance of the parties' home and
domestic affairs, leaving the doctor free to pursue his
career.

R000242 at 12-17, 113-117.
In short, Mrs. Dunn was totally devoted and faithful

to her marriage for eleven years.

R000242 at 119-120. There

is no evidence in the record of misconduct or fault on her
parte

The marriage terminated because Dr. Dunn chose a new

companion.
C.

The Parties' Circumstances At The Time Of
Trial.

During 1986, Dr. Dunn became involved with another
woman, a 25-year old receptionist.

After approximately eight

months, he told Mrs. Dunn of the affair and moved from the
parties' residence, indicating his intention that the marriage
be terminated.

R000242 at 6-9, 119-120. At the time of trial,

Dr. Dunn was residing with his new companion, whom he has since
married.
health.

R000242 at 8-9.

At age 50, he is in excellent

His gross income is approximately $30,000 per month,

including the royalties from the surgical instruments designed
during the marriage as well as the substantial income derived
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from his medical practice and related work.

R000242 at 21,

1987 income tax return, Trial Exhibit P-l.
After the parties' separation, Mrs. Dunn enrolled at
the University of Utah.

At the time of trial in May 1988, she

had attended the University full-time for 18 months, was
working toward a bachelor's degree in commercial recreation and
tourism, and hoped to earn her M.B.A.

Almost 37 years old at

the time of trial, Mrs. Dunn testified that it will take five
years of full-time study to complete her education, but she is
experiencing medical problems which might delay her progress.
R000242 at 112-113, 120-121, 135, 188.
D.

The Trial Court's Exclusion Of Substantial
Assets From The Marital Estate.

Dr. Dunn's professional corporation, royalty rights,
and retirement benefits were the most substantial assets
accrued during the marriage.

Yet, the trial court excluded the

entire value of the professional corporation and royalty rights
and a substantial amount of the retirement benefits accrued
during the marriage from the marital estate, without any
compensating award to Mrs. Dunn.
exclusions totaled over $370,000.

R000211-000215.

Those

Trial Exhibits D-2, D-25,

R000240 at 45-46.
1.

The Professional Corporation.

Dr. Dunn is the sole shareholder and employee of the
professional corporation which he formed in 1981.
34-36.

R000242 at

His accountant, Keith F. Barnett, C.P.A., testified
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that the net value of that corporation as of March 31, 1988 was
$115,845.

R000241 at 65.

The balance sheet prepared by Mr.

Barnett reflected $79,000 in cash, an advance receivable of
$53,224 from Dr. Dunn, fixed assets valued at $11,435, and
furniture valued at $2,500.

Liabilities totaled only $30,314,

leaving a net value of $115,845.

R000241 at 62-65, 67; Trial

Exhibit D-25. Mrs. Dunn's expert witness, Blaine Nelson,
C.P.A., placed a higher value on the professional corporation,
including a value for good will.
P-17.

R000240 at 21, Trial Exhibit

The trial court found that no value should be attributed

to good will, a decision which Mrs. Dunn does not challenge in
this appeal.

R000212-000213.

The court also found "that the professional
corporation has net tangible assets exclusive of good will, but
those net tangible assets are not marital assets and are not
subject to division in this action."
challenges this exclusion.

R000213.

Mrs. Dunn

Dr. Dunn's own expert considered

the professional corporation to be a marital asset.
Exhibit D-25.

See Trial

Indeed, the trial court even recognized the

$53,224 advance from the corporation to Dr. Dunn to be a
marital obligation.

R000221.

Yet, it excluded from the

marital estate the entire value of the professional
corporation's net assets, including the $53,224 advance and the
$79,000 in cash, without any compensating award to Mrs. Dunn.
R000213.
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2.

Royalty Rights Under The December 1,
1985 License Agreement.

The December 1, 1985 License Agreement entitles
Dr. Dunn to fixed quarterly payments totaling $375,000 between
1986 and 1990; $243,750 of those royalties remained to be paid
at the time of trial.

Trial Exhibit P-4, Article IV.

Mrs. Dunn's expert, Blaine Nelson, calculated the present value
of the remaining royalty payments at $232,572, based upon an
8.5 percent discount rate.

R000240 at 45-46.

The royalties are Dr. Dunn's consideration for a
license to use and sell the surgical instruments which he
designed for the implantation of the Miller-Galante knee.
Dr. Dunn developed those instruments during the marriage for
Zimmer, which had the marketing rights to the Miller-Galante
2/
knee but no appropriate instruments for its implantation.R000241 at 37-39, 123-124.
The only conditions to the fixed royalty payments are
that Zimmer not discontinue the instruments from its standard
product line, and that its prior year's sales of the
Miller-Galante knee be more than $40 million.
Article IV.

Exhibit P-4,

Zimmer has been marketing the instruments and

paying Dr. Dunn the fixed royalties under the Agreement since

**-'
Dr. Dunn had previously developed surgical instruments
to be used in implanting a defferent type of artificial knee, a
"dual patella knee" sold by Johnson & Johnson. Those
instruments were not suitable for use in installing the
Miller-Galante knee. The new instruments he developed to
install the Miller-Galante knee did not incorporate the design
of the prior instruments. R000241 at 37-39.
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1986.

R000242 at 40.

Dr. Dunn characterized the royalties on

the parties' joint 1987 income tax return as "installment
payments from the sale of propertyoH

Schedule D to 1987 Income

Tax Return, Trial Exhibit P-l.
Dr. Dunn testified that the December 1, 1985 Agreement
was unique,,

He explained that he had negotiated fixed royalty

payments for the instruments rather than the more typical
percentage royalty to be sure that he would be paid for the use
of the surgical instruments as long as the Miller-Galante knee
was on the market, regardless of the terms on which Zimmer
marketed the instruments with the knee.

By comparison, he

referred to his license agreement with Zimmer for an artificial
hip he is developing as a typical Zimmer royalty agreement,
which calculates royalties as two percent of net sales.
R000242 at 47-50, Trial Exhibit P-5, Article IV.
The hip agreement, in which Mrs. Dunn claims no
interest, expressly requires Dr. Dunn to Mact as a consultant
for Zimmer and perform consultant services with respect to
completing the development and design of [the artificial hip]
and also with respect to making presentations about [the hip,]"
including -participation in workshops and meetings.at 49-50, Trial Exhibit P-5, Article X.

R000242

Dr. Dunn's consultant

agreement with Zimmer concerning spinal devices, which expired
shortly before the trial, also required him to participate in
workshops and lectures concerning spinal systems and related
instruments.

R000242 at 51-53, Trial Exhibit P-6.
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The December 1, 1985 License Agreement contains no
such provision.

Like the hip agreement, it requires Dr. Dunn

to assist Zimmer in patent applications, infringement disputes,
product testing and regulatory compliance.

But unlike the hip

agreement and consultant agreement, it contains no provision
that would require Dr. Dunn to appear at seminars or to perform
any other personal services in connection with the surgical
instruments.

R000242 at 47-50, Trial Exhibits P-4, P-5, P-6.

Dr. Dunn testified that he had attended workshops in
connection with the surgical instruments as well as the hip and
spine devices.

He estimated he had traveled approximately 28

days in the previous year in connection with all three of his
agreements with Zimmer, and that approximately three-fourth of
that travel was in connection with the surgical instruments.
But he could not identify any language in the License Agreement
which required such travel or made it a condition of payment.
R000242 at 40-44.
The trial court found that, although the hip agreement
required it and the December 1, 1985 Agreement did not,
Dr. Dunn traveled in connection with both agreements and both
would be "virtually worthless" without his continued services.
On that basis, it excluded the entire value of the royalty
rights under the December 1, 1985 Agreement from the marital
estate.

R000211-000212.
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3.

Retirement Benefits Accrued During The
Marriage.

During the marriage/ Dr. Dunn accrued substantial
retirement benefits in three retirement plans:

the

professional corporation's Defined Benefit Plan, the
University's TIAA-CREF Plan, and the Shriners Hospital Annuity
Plan.

The trial court's method of valuing those benefits had

the effect of excluding from the marital estate substantial
benefits accrued during the marriage.
First, the court used a present value analysis without
having evidence of the actual present values.

It relied upon

accountings which were dated as much as 15 months before trial,
even though the evidence at trial established that substantial
contributions had been made in the interim.

The professional

corporation's 1987 financial statement reflects that Dr. Dunn
contributed $23,000 to the Defined Benefit Plan in 1987 alone.
The amount of contributions made to Dr. Dunn's other retirement
plans between the dates of the statements produced by Dr. Dunn
and the time of trial was never determined.

See R000102,

R000214-000215, R000242 at 55-56, Trial Exhibit P-2, Item 548,
and Trial Exhibit D-25.
Second, the court granted Dr. Dunn credits not only
for $43,173 in benefits he claimed to have accrued before the
marriage, but also for projected earnings of $90,908 on those
interests after the marriage.

Those credits were granted even
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though Dr. Dunn admitted he had made no effort to segregate the
benefits accrued before the marriage and had no records
identifying the rate of accrual or the contributions made after
the marriage.

R000214-000215, R000242 at 56-57, Trial Exhibit

D-25, Schedule IV.
Third, the court awarded Mrs. Dunn only a fixed dollar
amount equal to one-third of the remainder, without making any
provision for her to receive either an immediate distribution
or accruals if the distribution were deferred and without any
offsetting award of other assets.

R000218-000219.

As a

result, Mrs. Dunn received substantially less than one-third of
the retirement benefits accrued during the marriage, without
any compensating award of other property.
E.

The Trial Court's Award Of Two-Thirds Of
The Remaining Marital Assets To Dr. Dunn.

After excluding Dr. Dunn's professional corporation,
royalty rights and recent retirement benefits from the marital
estate, the trial court also awarded Dr. Dunn two-thirds of the
remaining marital assets. As reflected in Appendix 1, the
result was to award Dr. Dunn approximately 80 percent of the
marital estate.
In addition to the fixed interests in the retirement
plans, Mrs. Dunn received two cars worth $16,975, $5,646 of a
promissory note having a balance of $33,785, an IRA valued at
$11,023, $63,629 of the net equity in the parties' residence,
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and $24,168 of the cash and securities held personally.
R000218-000219.

Thus, Mrs. Dunn received only about $265,000

of a marital estate worth more than $1.1 million.

See Appendix

1.
Dr. Dunn, on the other hand, received all of the
remaining benefits in the three retirement plans, with a value
in excess of $300,000, two cars worth $41,800, an airplane
worth $30,000, the $28,139 balance of the promissory note, an
IRA valued at $3,946, an interest in a Snowbird condominium
worth $48,704, the $16,030 increase in the equity of a ranch he
owned before the marriage, his $63,629 of the home equity and
his $24,168 of the cash and securities held personally, as well
as the assets of the professional corporation and all of the
royalties payable under the December 1, 1985 License
Agreemente

R000219-000221.

Altogether, he was awarded more

than $850,000 in addition to his ranch, which has a net equity
of $245,000.

Appendix 1, Trial Exhibit D-25, Schedule I.

The disproportion in the award of the remaining
property resulted partly from the allowance of almost $150,000
4/
in credits— for assets which Dr. Dunn brought into the
*-'
Dr. Dunn received the $79,000 cash held by the
professional corporation, which was excluded from the marital
estate.
4/
Those credits include the $90,908 in projected postmarriage accruals on $43,173 in retirement benefits Dr. Dunn
claimed to have acquired before the marriage, a $26,000 credit
against the airplane, a $22,493 credit against the promissory
note, and a net credit of $6,600 against the automobiles. See
Trial Exhibit D-25.
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marriage# the proceeds of which had admittedly been commingled
with marital property.

For example, the court allowed Dr. Dunn

a $26/000 credit for a premarital airplane which he sold for
$10/000 after the marriage.

Dr. Dunn testified that the Cessna

210 Turbo which the parties owned at the time of trial was
purchased in 1981 with a down payment of $6/500 from the
proceeds of the sale of the prior plane.

Both parties agreed

that the $47,844 in installment payments on the Cessna were
made entirely from marital income.

R000242 at 63-66/ 134-135;

R000241 at 28-29; Trial Exhibit P-7.

Because 88 percent of the

Cessna's cost was paid with marital income/ Mrs. Dunn's expert
testified that its value in the marital estate was 88 percent
of its stipulated value of $30/000/ or $26#400.
54.

R000240 at

But the trial court allowed Dr. Dunn a credit of $26/000

for the old airplane, reducing the value of the Cessna in the
marital estate from $30/000 to $4/000.

R000240 at 4, 68-69/

89-90; Trial Exhibit D-25, III.
The court gave a similar credit against a promissory
note which the parties held as joint property.

In 1984/ the

parties sold the condominium they had occupied throughout their
marriage in return for a cash down payment and a promissory
note payable to them jointly.

They invested the cash in their

new home/ and deposited the payments on the promissory note
into their joint bank account.

R000242 at 59-60/ 124-125. At

the time of trial/ the note had a stipulated value of $33#785.
Yet, the trial court excluded all but $11#292 of that value

-15-

from the marital estate, giving Dre Dunn a credit for his
estimated premarital equity in the condominium.

R000216.

See

Trial Exhibit D-25.
Credits favoring Dr. Dunn were also given for
premarital automobiles.

Dr. and Mrs. Dunn both testified that

they had sold the cars they owned before their marriage and
commingled the proceeds with marital funds.
R000242 at 149.

R000240 at 31;

Nevertheless, the trial court granted credits

of $8,700 for Dr. Dunn's premarital automobile and $2,100 for
Mrs. Dunn's premarital automobile.

See R000240 at 88-89.

The overall division of property, with the court's
allowance of these exclusions and credits totaling over
$500,000, gave Dr. Dunn approximately 80 percent of the marital
estate, as reflected on Appendix 1.

Since the court granted

only three years alimony and denied Mrs. Dunn's request for
attorney f€*es, its decision left her with extremely limited
financial resources compared to those retained by Dr. Dunn.
See R000218-000223, Trial Exhibits P-13, P-15 and P-18, and
Appendix 1«
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The district court's property division was based upon
an interpretation of Section 30-3-5(1) which is in direct
conflict with the equitable standards established by the Utah
suprme court.

Under those standards, it was error to exclude

corporate assets, royalty rights and retirement benefits valued

-16-

at more than $370,000 from the marital estate, when 67 percent
of the remaining marital assets were also awarded to the
husband and there were no compensating factors favoring the
wife.

Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076 (Utah 1988); Lee v.

Lee, 744 P.2d 1378 (Utah App. 1987).

Dr. Dunn's professional

corporation and royalty rights should have been treated as
marital property, Gardner v. Gardner, supra: Lee v. Lee, supra:
Wilkins v. Stout, 588 P.2d 145 (Utah 1978), and all of the
retirement benefits he accrued during the marriage should have
been divided equitably.

Gardner v. Gardner, supra: Woodward v.

Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982); Marchant v. Marchant, 743
P.2d 199 (Utah App. 1987).

Moreover, the additional credits of

almost $150,000 for assets Dr. Dunn brought into the marriage
should not have been allowed, because the assets in question
had admittedly been commingled with and treated as joint
property during the marriage, and the credits rendered the
overall distribution inequitable.

Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760

P.2d 304 (Utah 1988) .
Awarding Dr. Dunn approximately 80 percent of the
marital estate was manifestly unjust.
supra.

Gardner, supra; Lee,

Since Mrs. Dunn has no separate property or income, was

awarded only three years' alimony, and was required to pay her
own attorney fees, there were no compensatory factors to
justify such a disproportionate award.

See Mortensen v.

Mortensen, supra; Workman v. Workman, 652 P.2d 931 (Utah
1982).

Certainly, there was no evidence of misconduct or waste
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on her part.

To the contrary, it was undisputed that she had

devoted all her efforts during the eleven-year marriage to
supporting her husband's career.

See Savage v. Savage, 658

P.2d 1201 (Utah 1988); Lee v. Lee, supra.
The trial court based its disproportionate property
division on the ground that, having enjoyed a high standard of
living during the marriage as a benefit of Dr. Dunn's earning
capacity, Mrs. Dunn was not entitled to share equitably in the
property acquired during the marriage.

This is not a

permissible consideration under the standards established by
the Utah supreme court.

Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133 (Utah

1987); Savage v. Savage, supra: Lee v. Lee, supra.

Under those

standards, marital property must be allocated in a manner which
best serves the interests of both parties and allows them both
to continue a standard of living as close as possible to the
standard they enjoyed during the marriage.

Gardner v. Gardner,

supra: Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985).

A spouse who

contributes to the marriage by performing domestic duties and
unpaid clerical functions is entitled to share in the financial
assets accumulated with the working spouse's income.

The fact

that a spouse who did not work outside the home enjoyed a
standard of living beyond his or her own earning capacity is no
reason to deprive that spouse of an equitable share of the
marital estate.

Savage v. Savage, supra: Lee v. Lee, supra.

Because it is based upon an improper ground and conflicts with
the equitable standards imposed by Section 30-3-5(1) and the
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case law interpreting that provision, the trial court's
property division should be reversed.
ARGUMENT
A.

It Was Manifestly Inequitable To Exclude
From The Marital Estate The Value Of The
Professional Corporation. Royalty Rights.
And A Substantial Portion Of The Retirement
Benefits The Husband Accrued During The
Marriage, When 67 Percent Of The Remaining
Marital Assets Were Also Awarded To The
Husband.

1.

It Was Error To Exclude Substantial Marital
Assets Without Any Compensatory Award To
Mrs. Dunn.

Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-5(1) (1984) provides that
H

[w]hen a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include

in it equitable orders relating to the . . . property."

The

Utah supreme court has repeatedly held that since the statutory
language contains no hint of limitation, all of the parties'
assets, income, and potential earning capacity should be
considered by the trial court in determining the most equitable
way to serve the interests and welfare of both parties.

E.g.,

Burke v. Burke, supra: Englert v. Englert, 576 P.2d 1274, 1276
(Utah 1978).
While the supreme court has declined to establish a
strict mathematical formula requiring an equal division of
property in all cases, an award of 80 percent to one party
certainly violates the equitable standard imposed by Section
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30-3-5(1)•

Indeed, if 80 percent awards were allowed, there

would be no standard at all.
Disproportionate divisions and exclusions of marital
property have only been upheld by the Utah supreme court when
there were significant compensating factors for the party
receiving the smaller award.

For example, in Mortensen v.

Mortensen. supra, the award to the husband of all of the stock
he had received from his parents during the marriage was
upheld, since the wife was awarded two-thirds of the remaining
property.

IdL at 309.

In Workman v. Workman, supra, the

supreme court affirmed an award of 60 percent of the marital
property to the wife and 40 percent to the husband, because the
husband had been allowed to retain his entire pension without
any alimony obligations.

14. at 933.

Similarly, in Doau v.

Doau. 652 P.2d 1308 (Utah 1982), the court upheld the award of
the entire value of a solely-owned professional corporation to
the husband, because the trial court had awarded the wife
liquid assets sufficient to offset the corporate assets.
In the absence of such compensatory factors, the
exclusion of valuable assets acquired during the marriage from
the marital estate has been grounds for reversal.

For example,

in Gardner v. Gardner, supra, the trial court did not value the
physician-husband's interests in a medical clinic and
retirement benefits, but awarded them exclusively to the
husband with no compensating award to the wife.

The supreme

court reversed and remanded for a valuation of the medical and
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retirement assets and a redistribution of the marital estate on
the basis of those findings.
In Lee v. Lee, supra, this court reversed the award to
the husband of a 52 percent interest in a business which was
the principal asset of the marriage.

It emphasized that since

the wife had assisted in the operation of the business by
performing clerical duties, and had allowed the husband to
participate full-time in the business by assuming all of the
domestic burdens, it was a clear abuse of discretion to award
the interest in the business exclusively to the husband with no
compensating award to the wife.
Gardner and Lee are directly on point and require
reversal of the district court's decision in this case.

As in

those cases, the trial court excluded substantial assets
acquired during the marriage without any compensating award to
the wife.

Because it also awarded 67 percent of the remaining

marital assets to the husband, the overall property
distribution gave Dr. Dunn approximately 80 percent of the
property acquired during the marriage.

Mrs. Dunn had no

separate assets or income, nor was she awarded long-term
alimony to compensate for such an inequitable division.

There

was neither evidence in the record nor any basis in the law to
justify such a one-sided result.
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2.

The Exclusions And Credits Which The
District Court Granted To Dr. Dunn Are In
Conflict With Current Utah Law,

(a)

The Professional Corporation Should Be
Included In The Marital Estate,

Given the recent decisions in the Gardner and Lee
cases, there can be no doubt that the value of the net tangible
assets of Dr. Dunn's professional corporation should have been
included in the marital estate.

Gardner established that the

interest of a physician doctor in a professional corporation is
subject to valuation and division in a divorce.

Lee

established that a wife who supports her husband's development
of a business through secretarial and domestic support is
entitled to share in its value when the marriage ends, even if
he acquired his interest with proceeds of premarital property.
In this case, Dr. Dunn's professional corporation was
founded and its assets were accrued during the marriage.

Those

assets consisted of $79,000 in cash, an advance receivable from
Dr. Dunn which, ironically, was treated as a marital
obligation, and furniture and equipment acquired during the
marriage.

Under Utah law, the net worth of the corporation's

assets reflected on the balance sheet prepared by Dr. Dunn's
own accountant is an appropriate measure of the corporation's
value.

Argyle v. Argyle, 688 P.2d 468 (Utah 1984); Lee v. Lee,

supra at 1381.
It was manifestly unfair to exclude those assets from
the marital estate, leaving Dr. Dunn with the $79,000 in cash
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and other assets of the corporation, with no offsetting award
to Mrs. Dunn.

From the time the corporation was established in

1981, Mrs. Dunn performed bookkeeping and secretarial functions
for it without pay.

Because she assumed all of the couple's

domestic burdens, Dr. Dunn was free to devote his efforts to
income-producing activities.

They are both entitled to a fair

and equitable share of the financial assets accumulated by
virtue of their joint efforts.
1204; Lee v. Lee, supra.

See Savage v. Savage, supra at

Therefore, the case should be

remanded for inclusion of the $115,845 value of the corporation
established by Dr. Dunn's accountant.
(b)

Dr. Dunn's Royalty Interest Under The
December 1, 1985 Agreement Is A Marital
Asset.

For the same reasons, Dr. Dunn's valuable royalty
rights in the surgical instruments he developed during the
marriage should also be included in the marital estate.

In

Wilkins v. Stout, supra, the Utah supreme court upheld the
award to the wife of a one-third interest in royalties to be
received by the husband on books he had written during the
marriage.

Other courts have also ruled that a wife has an

interest in royalty rights on literary works and inventions
derived from the creative efforts, time and skill of the
husband during the marriage.

E.g., Worth v. Worth, 195 Cal.

App. 3d 768, 241 Cal. Rptr. 135 (Cal. App. 1 Dist. 1987); Howes
v. Howes, 436 So.2d 689 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1983), cert, denied,
441 So.2d 216 (La. 1983).

See also Whatley v. Whatley, 439
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So.2d 444 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1983); Young v. Young. 472 P.2d 784
(Wyo. 1970).
The surgical instruments were completed and the
License Agreement executed as of December 1, 1985.

Dr. Dunn

has been collecting royalties since that time, and has
characterized them as installment payments from the sale of
property.

Under these circumstances, the $232,572 present

value of the royalty rights under the December 1, 1985 License
Agreement should be included in the marital estate, and
MrSo Dunn should either share in the royalty payments or
receive an offsetting award of other property.
There is nothing in the License Agreement which
conditions the payment of royalties on Dr. Dunn's conducting
occasional workshops for Zimmer.

But even if some occasional

services were connected with the License Agreement, that would
not be sufficient reason to exclude an asset worth $232,572
from the marital estate altogether.
supra.

See Gardner, supra; Lee,

Royalty payments on surgical instruments developed

during a marriage are marital property, just as royalty
payments on books written during a marriage would be.
Occasional services to promote the surgical instruments do not
change their character as marital property, any more than the
occasional appearance of an author at a bookstore would change
the marital character of books written during a marriage.
Wilkins v. Stout, supra.
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See

(c)

The Trial Court's Division Of Retirement
Benefits Conflicts With The Standards
Established By The Supreme Court And This
Court.

In the absence of competent evidence of their present
value, the trial court should have awarded Mrs. Dunn an
equitable share of the retirement benefits accrued during the
marriage, to be determined by the trustee of each retirement
plan under the provisions of the federal statutes for qualified
plans.

See Woodward, supra: Bailey v. Bailey, 745 P.2d 830

(Utah App. 1987); Marchant v. Marchant, supra.

Instead, it

awarded her only a fixed dollar amount of values which excluded
substantial contributions and accruals during the marriage,
with no provision for distribution.

This was directly contrary

to the rulings of the Utah supreme court and this court.
It was error to award a fixed dollar amount based on a
"present value analysis" without having competent evidence of
the present value at the time of trial.

The outdated

accountings adopted by the trial court obviously did not
reflect a present value.

Dated up to 15 months before trial,

they indisputably excluded substantial benefits which Dr. Dunn
had accrued during the last several years of the marriage.
In Berqer v. Beroer, 713 P.2d 695 (Utah 1985), the
supreme court reversed a valuation of marital property based on
such stale data.

It held that an accounting made a year before

trial was not admissible evidence on the value of a corporation
as of the date of divorce, and a new trial was required to
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determine the value as of that data.

id. at 698.

In Marchant

v. Marchant, supra, the supreme court held that it was error
for a trial court to award a wife one-third of the present
value which the husband placed on his retirement benefits,
without corroborating evidence.

Under these rulings, the trial

court's adoption of accountings dated up to 15 months before
trial, which admittedly did not reflect contributions made in
the interim, must be reversed.
Furthermore, this court has stressed that a trial
court may divide retirement benefits based on their present
value only if it makes specific findings on both the present
value and the reasons for an immediate distribution.
Bailey, 745 P.2d 133 (Utah App. 1987).

Bailey v.

See Rayburn v. Rayburn,

738 P.2d 238 (Utah App. 1987) (affirming the award to the wife
of one-half the present value of the husband's retirement
benefits, payable by him over five years with interest).

The

trial court did not make such findings in this case, nor did it
order an immediate distribution of the amounts awarded to
Mrs. Dunn.

Indeed, the trial court's decision leaves it

unclear whether Mrs. Dunn will even receive the accruals on the
fixed amounts awarded to her in a deferred distribution.
R000218-000219.

The trial court denied Mrs. Dunn's motion for

clarification of that issue.

R000152 at 000161-000164.

R000203-000204.
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In Marchant v. Marchant, supra, this court held that/
in the absence of competent evidence of present value,
retirement benefits should be divided according to a formula
based on the number of years of the marriage divided by the
total number of years in which the husband participated in the
retirement plan.

Such a deferred distribution based upon a

fixed percentage was approved by the Utah supreme court in
Woodward v. Woodward, supra.

Given Dr. Dunn's failure to

identify the present value of his retirement benefits, this
matter should be remanded for equitable division of those
benefits in the manner approved in Woodward and Marchant.
(d) The Credits Grgntefl TQ Drf Dunn For
Premarital Assets Violate The Recent
Utah Case Authority.
The trial court allowed almost $150,000 in credits
favoring Dr. Dunn against the retirement benefits which he had
accrued during the marriage, the automobiles and airplane which
were purchased during the marriage, and the promissory note
which Dr. and Mrs. Dunn held and treated as joint property
during the marriage.

See note 4, supra.

Those credits violate

the Utah case law defining the appropriate treatment of
property brought into a marriage.
Under that case law, a party to a divorce is not
automatically credited with the claimed value of every item of
property he brought into the marriage.
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See Burke v. Burke,

supra at 135. Where the identity of separate property is lost
through commingling or exchanges, or where the spouse's conduct
indicates his intention to treat the property or its proceeds
as marital property, it becomes part of the marital estate.
Mortensen v. Mortensen, supra at 307-308. Moreover, when the
husband lacks accurate records to substantiate his claim that
the value of properties held at the time of the divorce came
from the proceeds of separate property, he is not entitled to
credits against the marital assets.

Teece v. Teece, 715 P.2d

106 (Utah 1986).
The credits for Dr. Dunn's premarital car and airplane
were improper because those assets were used for family
purposes and then sold.

With the exception of the $6,500 down

payment on the Cessna airplane, the proceeds were admittedly
commingled with marital property.

See Mortensen v. Mortensen,

Supra at 308.
The credit against the promissory note held jointly by
Dr. and Mrs. Dunn was also improper, because property is not
treated as separate "when the acquiring spouse places title in
[the parties'] joint names in such a manner as to evidence an
intent to make it marital property."

Mortensen, supra at 307.

The trial court's findings reflect that all of the proceeds of
the sale of the condominium, including the note and all
payments received on it, were consistently treated as joint
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property by both parties. R000215.

Under those circumstances/

the credit for Dr. Dunn's claimed equity in the condominium in
1977 was inappropriate.
Nor was Dr. Dunn entitled to $90/908 in credits
against the retirement benefits he accrued during the marriage,
when he had no records of the accruals and contributions since
1977 and had never indicated any intention that those accruals
constituted separate property.

Teece, supra at 107-108;

Mortensen, supra at 308.
While each of these credits was inappropriate in
itself, the principal issue before this court is the overall
disproportion in the property division to which they
contributed.

In considering the appropriate treatment of

property brought into a marriage, the overriding consideration
is that the ultimate division be equitable —
fairly divided between the parties.
supra.

that property be

E.g., Burke v. Burke.

The overall property division in this case does not

meet that standard.
Be

The Fact That Mrs. Dunn Enioved A Standard
Of Living Beyond Her Own Earning Capacity
During The Marriage Was Not A Permissible
Ground For Awarding 80 Percent Of The
Assets Accumulated During The Marriage To
Dr. Dunn.

The trial court based its disproportionate property
division on the ground that/ having enjoyed a standard of
living beyond her own earning capacity during the marriage as a
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benefit of Dr. Dunn's economic talents, Mrs. Dunn was not
entitled to share equitably in the property acquired during the
marriage.

This is not a proper consideration under the

standards established by the Utah supreme court and this
court.
There is no authority whatsoever for the trial court's
premise that a wife's enjoyment during the marriage of a
standard of living beyond her own earning capacity is a
substitute for an equitable division of the property when the
marriage ends.

To the contrary, the Utah cases hold that a

disproportionate property division will not be allowed in the
absence of compensating factors, and the post-divorce living
standards of both parties should be as close as possible to the
standards they enjoyed during the marriage.

Gardner, supra:

Workman, supra: Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1333 (Utah
App. 1988).
Nor is there any authority for the trial court's
premise that the economically gifted partner in a marriage
should be awarded the bulk of the assets derived from his
gifts.

If that were the law, any non-working spouse who

contributed artistic, domestic and other non-economic talents
to a marriage would not be entitled to share in the property
acquired during the marriage with the employed spouse's
income.

This would render Section 30-3-5(1) meaningless.
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The district court focused almost exclusively on the
financial contribution which Dr. Dunn made to the marital
estate as a successful physician at the height of his career.
In doing so, it failed to consider the numerous other factors
delineated by the Utah supreme court for reaching an equitable
5/
property division.
There is no question that Dr. Dunn has completed his
professional training and developed a lucrative career while
Mrs. Dunn has not; that Dr. Dunn has tremendous earning
capacity while Mrs. Dunn does not; and that Dr. Dunn has
separate property in his ranch worth almost $250,000 while
Mrs. Dunn has no separate property or income.

The issue is

whether the party who has such superior economic resources
should be favored in the division of the marital property by a
4-to-l ratio, particularly when the evidence establishes that
5S
The supreme court has defined the factors for the trial
court to consider in fashioning an equitable property division as
follows:
The factors generally to be considered are the amount
and kind of property to be divided; whether the
property was acquired before or during the marriage;
the source of the property; the health of the
parties; the parties' standard of living, respective
financial conditions, needs, and earning capacity;
the duration of the marriage; the children of the
marriage; the parties* ages at time of marriage and
of divorce; what the parties gave up by the marriage;
and the necessary relationship the property division
has with the amount of alimony and child support to
be awarded.
Burke, supra at 135.
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the non-working spouse supported the development of those
resources by performing clerical, social and domestic
responsibilities.
The disproportionate division in this case resulted in
Mrs. Dunn facing a radical reduction in her financial resources
as well as her standard of living, while Dr. Dunn's economic
circumstances were barely affected by the divorce.

Indeed, the

trial court's decision rested on the premise that the parties'
post-divorce living standards should not be equalized, and that
Mrs. Dunn is not entitled to continue the standard of living
she enjoyed during the marriage, even though sufficient
resources are available to provide it.

This is in direct

conflict with the standard established by the Utah supreme
court, that marital property be allocated in a manner which
best serves the needs of both parties and allows them both to
readjust their lives to their new circumstances as well as
possible.

Gardner, supra at 1078; Burke, supra at 135.

See

Jones v. Jones, supra.
Mrs. Dunn was awarded alimony for only three years —
not long enough to complete her education.
$3,000 per month —

The amount

—

is only 10 percent of Dr. Dunn's gross

income for 1987. After payment of her attorney fees and the
purchase of a modest home, Mrs. Dunn will have very little cash
to finance the remainder of her education.

Considering the

limited assets awarded to her, the alimony clearly will not
"provide support for the wife as nearly as possible at the
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standard of living she enjoyed during the marriage.-

Jones v.

Jones, supra: See Rasband v. Rasband, supra at 1333 (HAn
alimony award should, to the extent possible, equalize the
parties' respective post-divorce living standards and maintain
them at a level as close as possible to that standard of living
enjoyed during the marriage.")
In contrast to the trial court's decision, the Utah
supreme court has long held that a non-working wife is entitled
to a fair and equitable share of the financial assets
accumulated during a marriage.

In the Savage case, for

example, the court held that a wife who had not worked outside
the home was entitled to share in her husband's business.

It

emphasized the very factors which the trial court rejected in
this case.
Virtually the entire present value of the
corporation was developed during the marriage
and, while it is true that the plaintiff took no
responsibility for the business, it was her
assumption of the domestic burdens which made
possible the defendant's full-time participation
in the business. She is therefore entitled to a
fair and equitable share of the financial
benefits accumulated by virtue of their joint
efforts in the marriage.
Savage v. Savage, supra at 1204.
This court's recent decision in Lee v. Lee is also
directly on point.
marriage.

The Lee case involved a nine-year

Like Mrs. Dunn, Mrs. Lee brought minimal property

into the marriage.

Like Mrs. Dunn, Mrs. Lee quit her clerical
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job after the marriage to perform unpaid clerical duties for
the husband's business as well as the usual domestic duties of
a housewife.

Like Dr. Dunn, Mr. Lee brought substantial assets

into the marriage.

Moreover, he used the proceeds of some of

those premarital assets to acquire the 52 percent interest in a
business which he owned at the time of the divorce.

As in this

case, the trial court awarded the valuable business interest to
the husband exclusively without placing a value on it, and
awarded the wife other assets having a much smaller value.
This court reversed and remanded to the district
court, directing that the wife be awarded her equitable share
of the business interest as well as other marital assets.

It

held that M[a] wife is entitled to a fair and equitable share
of the financial benefits accumulated by virtue of the parties'
joint efforts during the marriage."
citing Savage, supra at 1204.

Lee v. Lee, supra at 1380,

Since the corporation was

established "and its value was actualized" during the marriage,
it was to be treated as a marital asset.

Id. at 1380.

The trial court's decision in this case cannot be
reconciled with this court's ruling in the Lee case.

It is

based upon a policy consideration that is in direct conflict
with the equitable standards established for the division of
property in a divorce under Section 30-3-5(1).

By denying the

spouse who played a supportive role any meaningful share of the
property accrued during the marriage and suggesting that the
employed spouse is entitled to keep all the assets acquired
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with his income, the trial court's ruling violates the
fundamental precepts of Utah law governing marriage and
divorce.

It should/ therefore, be reversed.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Judgment of the

district court should be reversed and the case should be
remanded for a redistribution of the marital estate in
accordance with the decision of this court and the evidence
presented at trial.
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THE TRIAL COURT'S PROPERTY DIVISION
Mrs. Dunn

Dr. Dunn

Total

$ 63,629

$ 63,629

$127,258

Cash

10,687

10,686

21,373

Securities

13,481

13,482

26,963

Automobiles

16,975

41,800

58,775

26,400

26,400

28,139

33,785

Interest in Snowbird
condominium

48,704

48,704

Marital interest in
equity of ranch

16,030

16,030

Net equity in residence

Airplane (portion paid
from marital income)
Promissory Note

5,646

IRA Accounts

11,023

3,946

14,969

Retirement Benefits
Defined Benefit Plan

80,538

Remainder,
in excess
of 163,516

More than
244,054

TIAA-CREF Plan

39,271

Remainder,
in excess
of 79,732

More than
119,003

Shriners Hospital
Annuity Plan

23,563

Remainder,
in excess
of 47,841

More than
71,404

Royalty interest under
12/1/85 License Agreement

232,572

232,572

Net Assets of professional
corporation, including
$79,000 cash, and $53,224
receivable

115,845

115,845

Advance payable to
professional corporation
TOTALS

$264,813
or less
than 24%

Appendix 1

(53.224)
In excess of
$839,098
or 76%

(53.224)
In excess of
$1,103,911

